Of all the rural social movements in the world, those in post-socialist Russia are considered to be among the weakest ones. Nevertheless, triggered by the neo-liberal reforms in the countryside, state attention to agriculture, and rising land conflicts, new social movement organisations with a strong political orientation are emerging in Russia today. However, this sudden burst of civil activity raises questions about how genuine and independent the emerged organisations are. Our research shows that many rural movements, agricultural associations, farm unions, and rural political parties lack constituency, are supporting the status quo, and/or actually counterfeits (what we call 'phantom movement organisations').
Introduction 2
Faced with the issues of rural poverty, globalisation of food markets, land grabbing, and other contemporary rural problems, rural people all over the world have organised themselves in social movements in order to challenge the negative effects of the neoliberal development. Land rights movements of Latin America and Africa, peasant organisations in Asia, rural community associations and radical farmers' groups in Europe, North America and Australia work at village, regional, national and international levels to make sure that the voice of the rural people is heard at every level of decision-making (Woods 2008) .
The Russian rural population, on the contrary, is rather passive in defending its own interests and is not eager to engage in collective practices of contestation. The rural society in Russia was traditionally seen as conservative, politically apathetic, and phenomenally patient and endurant (Sanukov 1993 , Breshko-Breshkovskaya 2007 . The Russian villagers' reluctance to engage in overt collective protests 09 Jun 2014 , available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080 /03066150.2014 .918958#.VeCmsfmqqko. To cite this article: Mamonova, N., & Visser, O. (2014 . State marionettes, phantom organisations or genuine movements? The paradoxical emergence of rural social movements in post-socialist Russia. Journal of Peasant Studies, 41(4) , 491-516. is often explained by the legacy of the pre-revolutionary commune system in rural areas, which was based on mutual support and, therefore, reduced the vulnerability of individual households to adverse developments (Atkinson 1983 , Male 1971 ; 70 years of socialism, when the expression of disagreement with governmental actions was at least heavily frowned upon, with serious protest leading to deportation in the labour camps of the Gulag during Stalin's reign, or prosecution in later periods (Visser 2010) ; demographic characteristics such as ageing and the low density of rural population (see Perrie (1972) about rural mobilisation during the Russian Revolution, and Visser (2010) on the present-day mobilisation problems); the contemporary authoritarian regime of Putin, which is able to repress, divide, and demobilize undesired public protests.
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In such circumstances, when the rural population is unwilling to engage in political actions and when there is little space for contestations, the significant increase of rural social movement organisations that have emerged in the last decade might be seen as surprising. Based on our web search and interviews, we observed that nine out of ten rural civil organisations, agricultural associations, farm unions, and rural political parties were formed and registered in the period 2000-2012. 3 These claim to protect the interests of rural dwellers, fight against land grabbing and inequality in the countryside, and create a favourable climate for development of agricultural entrepreneurship in Russia. This sudden burst of civil activities has coincided with the economic recovery in agriculture, the increase in state subsidies to rural development projects, the rise of agro-investments, and the large-scale land acquisitions. 09 Jun 2014 , available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080 /03066150.2014 .918958#.VeCmsfmqqko. To cite this article: Mamonova, N., & Visser, O. (2014 . State marionettes, phantom organisations or genuine movements? The paradoxical emergence of rural social movements in post-socialist Russia. Journal of Peasant Studies, 41(4) , 491-516. For the purposes of this research we define rural social movement organisations (hereafter referred to as RSMOs) as formal civil (non-profit) organizations which are established by or on behalf of rural dwellers, have specific programs, policies, and practices, but share a common goal of representing the interests of the rural population at a local, regional and/or national levels, and therefore constitute a rural social movement. RSMOs thus differ from the broad understanding of civil or social organizations, the latter of which may or may not have a function in terms of representing their members politically.
This research is the first comprehensive study of RSMOs in post-Soviet Russia. Previous studies on post-Soviet rural politics have focused on the response strategies of the rural population to the state's agrarian reforms, and have prioritised informal practices, social networks and hidden protests over formal organisations (Wegren 2005 , Tauger 2005 , Humphrey 2002 ). However, more formalised collective action through social organisations can provide resources and an institutional base to rural movements, structure mass protest, and carry the movements' values and goals during periods of low mobilisation McCarthy 1987, Taylor 1989) . Studies of institutionalised civil organisations in post-Soviet Russia, which have been carried out on contemporary urban social movements, show the unexpected forms of collective action that can be discerned within the limited political opportunity structure 4 , once one goes beyond liberal and statist models of state-society relations (Fröhlich 2012 , Henry 2006 , Chebankova 2012 , Kulmala 2011 ). These studies demonstrate that movements (i.e.
environmental, animal rights, and disability movements) often cooperate with the state while at the same time being able to preserve their autonomy. This position diverges from earlier academic works on the post-Soviet social movements, which saw Russian civil society as underdeveloped and suppressed by an authoritarian regime (Hale 2002 , Janoski 1998 , Salamon and Anheier 1998 . The turn from viewing civil society as a counterforce to the state to viewing it as a collaborator with the state defines the recent changes in the state-society relation studies in Russia and globally (Kröger 2011 ).
This article follows the emerging understanding of state-society relations and takes the limited political opportunity structure as the starting point. We analyse RSMOs in the 'Russian climate', where civil society organisations have close relations with the state while sometimes also contributing to the 'war of position', i.e. creating alternative institutions and alternative intellectual resources within the existing society (Fröhlich 2012 , Chebankova 2012 ). Although we build our arguments upon many assumptions drawn from contemporary urban social movement studies, we acknowledge the This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in the Journal of Peasant Studies on 09 Jun 2014 , available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080 /03066150.2014 .918958#.VeCmsfmqqko. To cite this article: Mamonova, N., & Visser, O. (2014 existence of rural specificities, such as the aversion of rural dwellers to open group actions and highly politicized issues of land tenure in agricultural investments.
The paper questions several assumptions in the theories on social movements and state-society relations, and aims to provide new insights into rural political actions. It contributes to understanding the Russian civil society from the angle of RSMOs and broadens our view on civil contentious politics in rural areas in post-Soviet contexts in particular and under (semi)authoritarian regimes in general.
We structure our analysis as follows. In the next (second) section we discuss the post-Soviet land reform and the potential 'open moments' for collective political actions which appeared at the time.
Further, we introduce the current situation, characterised by the rise of large-scale land acquisitions, agricultural investments, and increased state support of agriculture and rural development projects.
This allows us to understand the context in which RSMOs have emerged. In the third section we present our classification of RSMOs and discuss their state embedding and organisational affiliations, their connection with the local population, as well as the genuineness (as opposed to a counterfeit existence) of these organisations. We distinguish five types of RSMOs: grassroots organizations, professionalized organizations, government affiliates, politically oriented organisations/parties, and phantom movements. Finally, in section four we conclude with our preliminary findings, questions for discussion and deliberation, and an outline of some of our thoughts for further analysis and theoretical interpretation. As such, we aim to set an agenda for the study of RSMOs in Russia and the post-Soviet area at large (e.g. Ukraine and Kazakhstan), with a relevance extending to (semi)authoritarian and post-socialist contexts at a broader level.
This paper is largely based on qualitative data derived from in-depth interviews with representatives of seven RSMOs and two political agrarian parties which emerged from RSMOs. These interviews were 
The land reform and harsh transition period
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in the Journal of Peasant Studies on 09 Jun 2014 , available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080 /03066150.2014 .918958#.VeCmsfmqqko. To cite this article: Mamonova, N., & Visser, O. (2014 After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia embarked on a course of reforms (which Goodman (2003) called 'shock therapy'), with the ultimate goal of preventing the return to socialism.
The de-collectivisation of agriculture was pursued through the privatisation of collective farmland.
Kolkhozy and sovkhozy (collective and state farm enterprises), which possessed the major part of the agricultural land in the Soviet era, were forced to distribute their farmland by means of share-based certificates to their former employees. In such a way, the new Russian government wanted to create a system of small and medium commercial family farming in the country. However, due to the absence of financial resources and extension services, the existence of fragmented and dysfunctional markets and institutions, and the rural dwellers' unwillingness to leave the collectives, the majority of land recipients did not become private farmers (Visser and Spoor 2011, Wegren 2005) . Instead, land became accumulated in the hands of former kolkhoz/sovkhoz chairmen (or outside investors), who convinced land recipients to invest their land (and property) shares in the reorganised farm enterprises in order to preserve the integrity of large-scale production. As Spoor et al. (2012) argued, the land reform did not fundamentally change de facto land ownership. The kolkhozy and sovkhozy were transformed into private large farm enterprises (LFEs), while a large part of the rural population continued to practice subsistence farming on their household plots. The private family farm sector that was envisaged in the early 1990s only emerged to a limited extent.
5
The shift from a centralized to a market-oriented economy in the countryside was accompanied by price liberalisation and rising prices for agricultural inputs; the reduction of state support to agriculture, leading to the bankruptcy of many farm enterprises and growing unemployment; and the limitation or termination of the social functions provided by LFEs, which were formerly the responsibilities of kolkhozy and sovkhozy. All these factors have negatively affected life in rural areas.
The post-Soviet transition period was characterised by the ruralisation of poverty. The monetary income of rural residents accounted for one half of urban incomes per capita in late 1990s. 09 Jun 2014 , available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080 /03066150.2014 .918958#.VeCmsfmqqko. To cite this article: Mamonova, N., & Visser, O. (2014 people, 'voted with their feet' and moved to cities. Those who remained in the villages experienced a declining quality of life and increasing social problems.
According to Gourevitch (1986) [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] was characterised by democratisation of the society, expressed in strengthening freedom of speech and freedom of associations, which enlarged the political opportunity structure in the country. However, the civil society organisations that emerged at that time were largely urban, and many of them existed only on paper. Others were generally insignificant in terms of members (at most a few thousand people), organisationally amorphous, or lacked clear programs (Osokina 2009 ). Resistance did exist, but it was (and remains) mainly hidden. Nikulin (2003 Nikulin ( , 2010 considers villagers' gossiping, stealing, and foot-dragging to be forms of covert unorganised protest against LFEs, which fall into the category of 'everyday resistance' and 'weapons of the weak', as described by Scott (1985) . However, theft at the LFEs is in many cases better qualified as a continuation of the Soviet principle 'everything is collective, everything is mine' 7 (Panchenko et al. 2012 , Humphrey 1983 ) and an additional source of subsistence than an intentional act of disagreement.
The best known rural social organisation which emerged at that time was (and is) AKKOR (Russian
Association of Farmers and Agricultural Cooperatives).
It was established top-down by an informal 7 In the Soviet Union, stealing from collective farms was institutionalized. Humphrey (1983) discovered that the Soviet villagers used the 'word theft to refer only to stealing from one another ' (ibid, 136) . People presented pilfering at the farm as 'recovering things that were rightfully theirs, either because they'd worked on those things (harvested corn, pulled potatoes, or collected fruit) for inadequate pay or because they had once owned the land for growing these things and they were not getting enough to live on' (Humphrey 1983, 136) . For an account of how foot dragging and mediocre work was institutionalised at collective farms see Nove (1973) . 09 Jun 2014 , available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080 /03066150.2014 .918958#.VeCmsfmqqko. To cite this article: Mamonova, N., & Visser, O. (2014 order of the Soviet Ministry of Agriculture in 1990, when the first leasehold family farms started to emerge (Kopoteva 2012) . At that time, government subsidies and credits for private family farms were allocated via AKKOR, which gave it a great deal of power. After the subsidies to AKKOR were reduced, the projects on the ground to support farmers were curtailed, while lobbying among, and cooperating with, governmental bodies were maintained, if not intensified. This association will be discussed in more detail later in this paper. For a long time these two top-down created organisations were the only ones to deal with rural issues in Russia.
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Rise of interest in land and agriculture and the appearance of RSMOs
The Spurred by instability on financial markets, global food crisis, and the large supply and low cost of Russian farmland, many domestic and foreign 9 investors became interested in Russian agriculture and started to acquire farmland (Visser 2013) . The land rush was accompanied by the reinforcement of large-scale mono-crop farming and, especially in sub-urban and fertile agricultural regions, the , available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080 /03066150.2014 .918958#.VeCmsfmqqko. To cite this article: Mamonova, N., & Visser, O. (2014 Since the early 2000s, the state has stimulated agriculture through a range of instruments such as a debt restructuring programme, the establishment of a state-financed agricultural bank, subsidised crop insurance programmes, simplified and lowered taxes on agriculture, and subsidised loans for capital investment (Wegren 2007, 517) . Whereas in the 1990s the state support for the agricultural sector was sharply curtailed, it has markedly increased under Putin (Shagaida 2012) . Not only did agricultural business receive state attention, but many federal rural development programmes were also recently launched by the Russian government in order to improve the socio-economic situation in the villages. 12 At the same time, local governments often remain underfunded, and their development projects are largely dependent on the corporate social responsibility initiatives of LFEs, which provide significantly less support for the social infrastructure than their collective predecessors. Overall, however, during the Putin era the economic and infrastructural decline in many rural areas was halted and in some cases reversed.
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As a result of overall economic recovery and the inflow of private and state money in the countryside, the poverty rate fell to 25.4% in 2003, further falling to 15.4% in 2006 15.4% in (O'Brien et al. 2011 ). An extensive study by O'Brien et al. (2011, 24) shows that rural dwellers became less depressed and more satisfied with their incomes and their country, while their satisfaction with life in their village communities declined. , available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080 /03066150.2014 .918958#.VeCmsfmqqko. To cite this article: Mamonova, N., & Visser, O. (2014 Along with the socio-economic improvements in Russia, the last decade is also characterised by the contraction of the political opportunity structure. After Putin's rise to power in 2000, the process of democratisation that set in during the early 1990s turned into the direction of a 'guided democracy', with a growing influence of the state on the political arena. Effective opposition was curtailed in many ways. The entrance levels for new parties were raised, several bureaucratic hurdles were created, and the media, having become increasingly state-controlled, ignored or negatively portrayed opposition forces. Out of fear for the penetration of Western values and financial and organisational support that might stimulate protests and revolts similar to the colour revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia, the Russian state imposed restrictions on the activities of foreign NGOs and social organisations with foreign funds (Ostroukh 2010 ).
The constitutional 'right to disagree' has failed to move beyond the letter of the law in contemporary
Russia. The state's hostility towards criticism is often expressed in legal restrictions on collective actions, such as limiting the locations available for pickets and demonstrations (Politgazeta 2012).
Formally, the legal system offers the population quite a lot of opportunities to resolve civil disputes in courts (Jacobsson and Saxonberg 2012). However, when the dissent is related to a highly politicised issue such as land grabbing, the courts seem not to work in favour of the rural poor ).
Despite all these constraints, the last decade is also characterised by an increase in the number of
RSMOs. To what extent do these organisations respond to this declining satisfaction of life in village communities? Do they protect the interests and rights of rural dwellers in land disputes, or do they benefit from financial flows from the state budgets and domestic and foreign land investments? And how do the recovery of agriculture, and on the other hand the limited political opportunity structure, influence their emergence? Below we provide an analysis of contemporary RSMOs, and their relations with the state and the rural population.
Rural social movement organisations in Russia
In mapping the current RSMOs in Russia, we build on the categorisation of the social movement organisations into (1) grassroots organizations, (2) professionalized organizations, and (3) government affiliates, as developed by Henry (2006) in her study of the environmental movement in Russia.
Additionally, we include: (4) politically oriented organisations, and (5) phantom movement organisations, in order to capture the main types of actors working with rural issues (see Table 1 ).
Different groups of RSMOs are oriented toward different actors within the Russian political and economic environments and tend to pursue different varieties of civil activism. However, the , available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080 /03066150.2014 .918958#.VeCmsfmqqko. To cite this article: Mamonova, N., & Visser, O. (2014 Thus, they all are there.
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The convergence of the state with RSMOs is often mutual: social organisations gain resources and access; the state gains a firm control and the possibility to use civil society as an instrument to improve state governance (Richter 2009, 42) .
The popular expression of a Costa-Rican movement leader: 'there are two ways to kill an organisation, with repression or with money', used by Edelman (1999, 165) , available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080 /03066150.2014 .918958#.VeCmsfmqqko. To cite this article: Mamonova, N., & Visser, O. (2014 , available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080 /03066150.2014 .918958#.VeCmsfmqqko. To cite this article: Mamonova, N., & Visser, O. (2014 In order to help farmers, there is a need to be politically independent and unbiased and to have the courage to say a word against Putin's government. Although, the state-embedding gives the organisation an opportunity to pursue its activities, it decreases its autonomy and creates a gap between it and the rural population. The Russian state incorporates many RSMOs in order to create 'state marionettes' that support the current national agricultural and rural development policy, thus, reinforcing state power.
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Grassroots organisations
The The Front's leaders assert their claims through approved channels and use the regime's policies and legitimating myths to justify their defiance. As a partly institutionalized form of contention, the Russian anti-land-grab social movement organizes public events such as meetings, pickets, and rallies within the legal framework. Through these events, it draws the attention of federal, regional and local authorities to the dispossession of rural dwellers and their property rights violation as a result of land grabbing. Krestyanskiy Front represents its members in courts and fights against land raiders by demonstrating in front of their offices, and requesting statutory documents and public explanations.
Due to the efforts of Krestyanskiy Front, hundreds of rural dwellers were compensated for lost land plots .
Tamara Semenova, one of the leaders of Krestyanskiy Front, describes her personal story of fighting land grabbing:
In the Soviet period our farm enterprise was called sovkhoz Gorki-2; now it is Agrocomplex Gorki-2, Ltd. It is located on the most expensive land in the Moscow region -Rublevka, Zhukovka, Kolchuga, and Razdory. These days many oligarchs and nouveaux riches have houses there. Our director, a former 20 Interview conducted in March 2011, in Moscow. 21 Our own experiences in dealing with AKKOR suggest decreased accessibility and increased bureaucratization. For more than half a year, our research group has been trying to obtain an interview with the head of AKKOR, to no avail. The contentious politics of Krestyanskiy Front somewhat resembles the 'rightful resistance' in the Chinese countryside, described by O'Brien (1996) . However, in contrast with Chinese social movements, Russian legitimate protest is more limited. Under the Chinese regime's dominant (socialist) ideology, appealing to higher authorities when lower authorities misbehave can be an effective strategy. In contemporary Russia, applying to higher authorities is mostly to no avail. It is only occasionally successful, when combined with strong media attention and collective action.
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Some actors of other social organisations and authorities are critical of Krestyanskiy Front's methods.
In the majority of land disputes, Krestyanskiy Front demands financial compensation for its members, , available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080 /03066150.2014 .918958#.VeCmsfmqqko. To cite this article: Mamonova, N., & Visser, O. (2014 , available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080 /03066150.2014 .918958#.VeCmsfmqqko. To cite this article: Mamonova, N., & Visser, O. (2014 civil engagement could be considered opportunistic rational behaviour as described by Popkin (1979) , where the financial compensation for land plots represents the incentive that stimulates Russian rural dwellers to act in a group-oriented way. However, the appearance of overt organized resistance in Russia could also be perceived as an indication of emerging political consciousness among villagers.
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Political parties
One could expect that an increasingly contained political opportunity structure in Russia will lead to more apolitical methods of RSMO campaigning, which is observed in the case of some environmental, disability, or animal rights movements (Fröhlich 2012 , Henry 2006 , Chebankova 2012 , Kulmala 2011 . Counterintuitively, the RSMOs are becoming unduly politicized, as a number of these organisations have set a goal to transform into a political party. Our analysis of the political orientation of RSMOs suggests that this is not a by-product of successful mobilisation, as Walder (2009) , available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080 /03066150.2014 .918958#.VeCmsfmqqko. To cite this article: Mamonova, N., & Visser, O. (2014 (Apple) was involved in public demonstrations for the rights of rural dwellers, organized by Krestyanskiy Front. However, the description of Yabloko's participation by Tamara Semenova suggests that its involvement was rather pragmatic. Leaders from Yabloko gave speeches at public meetings with clear visibility, but did not commit to more sustained cooperation. 25 The leader of the political party Volia (Will), Svetlana Peunova, commented on the attention of political parties for the rural population:
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Public support is important to political parties registered in the Russian Federation only during the elections. In reality, none of them is concerned about the problems of the rural population. 'Nasha Zemlia believes that the decision of transforming Krestyanskiy Front into a political party is premature, opportunistic and does not match the current state of civil society in Russia'27.
In 2008, Krestyanskiy Front attempted to form a political party, but failed as it did not receive the required number of signatures and lost the support of Nasha Zemlia, which was its main partner in this endeavour. However, a year later, Larionov became a co-founder of the political social movement Selskaya Rossiya, and now he is one of the leaders of this new party.
This example demonstrates the inability of Russian RSMOs to form coalitions, which decreases the power of the social movement and shrinks the political opportunity structure, according to Tarrow (1998). Henry (2006) explains the difficulties of coalition-building between social organisations in Russia by the fact that their leaders, instead of searching for a consensus, prefer to spin-off and establish movements/political parties that fit their personal political ambitions (ibid, 101, 107) . This can explain the huge amount of RSMOs which never passed the stage of 'phantom movements', a trend which will be discussed in the next subsection. , available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080 /03066150.2014 .918958#.VeCmsfmqqko. To cite this article: Mamonova, N., & Visser, O. (2014 Therefore, their activities were limited by political, legal and economic constraints. In 2011, while this RSMO was being transformed into a political party, one of its leaders, Vasily Vershinin, commented on their chances to get into politics:
The chance is very small. I give it a three to five percent chance that we will be able to register as a party. They [United Russia] will not let us. These days we have parties that are not what people want.
That is all about the current government: if they allow it or not...
30
During the presidential election of 2012, Agrarii Rossii experienced the fate of its predecessor Agrarnaya Partiya Rossii. It radically changed its political orientation from socialist to pro-United Russia, and a rural appeal: 'Vote for Putin!' was adopted during its official assembly in February
2012
. 31 This transformation allowed the organisation to enter Russian political circles, but at the cost of its autonomy in policy and programme.
Therefore, contemporary agrarian political parties suffer from state-embedding and lack of autonomy in their programmes. The politicisation of RSMOs does not lead to formations of political forces as an alternative to the current political regime, but creates 'state marionettes' that unconditionally follow the instructions of the ruling party and do not represent a political force that can make changes. 28 An interest groups is virtually any voluntary association that seeks to publicly promote and create advantages for its cause.
For more information about the differences between social movements and interest groups see Meyer and Imig (1993) 29 Interview conducted March 2011, in Odintsovo, the Moscow region. This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in the Journal of Peasant Studies on 09 Jun 2014 , available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080 /03066150.2014 .918958#.VeCmsfmqqko. To cite this article: Mamonova, N., & Visser, O. (2014 
Phantom movement organisations
Phantom movement organisations are understood here as non-transparent, at most occasionally-active social organisations that pursue goals often different from the ones officially declared, in particular pursuing the aims of umbrella organisations and/or the leaders' personal aims instead of defending the interests of their declared constituencies. These movements have similarities with Latin-American ambivalent organisations studied by Junge (2012) and Edelman (1999) .
The appearance of 'shadow pseudopublics', described by Junge in his study of grassroots communities and NGOs in Brazil, resembles the Russian case. Junge (2012, 407) During the 2010-2012 period, an illegal development was underway at the Borodino museum reserve, where the Russian army fought Napoleon's troops in 1812. This area is considered national heritage by Russians. The boundaries of the Borodino reserve have never been officially defined or registered due to lack of funds. This has also enabled corrupt officials to manipulate this "no man's land." 100 private houses were being built on the Field of Borodino, a federal-level historical reserve, despite the continued efforts of law enforcement bodies, let alone culture protection agencies (Visser and Mamonova 2011) . In 2013, the court considered two criminal cases against the former head of the Borodino rural settlement, Maya Sklyueva. According to investigators, Sklyueva had been taking advantage of her official position and using forged documents from January 2007 to March 2008. She acquired the land area in the field of Borodino from the area towns Kosmovo and Old Village. Sklyueva is condemned to five years and six months imprisonment. The houses will be demolished. 33 Interview conducted March 2011, in Borodino, the Mozhaysk district, the Moscow region. , available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080 /03066150.2014 .918958#.VeCmsfmqqko. To cite this article: Mamonova, N., & Visser, O. (2014 . State marionettes, phantom organisations or genuine movements? The paradoxical emergence of rural social movements in post-socialist Russia. Journal of Peasant Studies, 41(4), power-holders and the access to information about the museum's landholdings made him a very strategically positioned person to pursue land grabbing on the territory of the Borodino museum.
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Remarkably, when several criminal cases were launched against the illegal constructions on Borodino lands in 2013, Myaukin did not appear in any of them. The head of the local administration, Maya Skluyeva, was imprisoned for 5 years for machinations regarding the historical lands. According to Sergey Kuznets, the head of social movement Komitet po Naslediyu (Committee on Heritage) in the Sergiev-Posad district:
The imprisonment of Skluyeva was just a farce. They needed to find the "scapegoat" in order to calm down the society. Skluyeva was, of course, engage in this fraud, but there were much larger fish... , available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080 /03066150.2014 .918958#.VeCmsfmqqko. To cite this article: Mamonova, N., & Visser, O. (2014 
Conclusions
We addressed the question of why rural social movement organisations (RSMOs) in Russia have been so weak. From narrow, liberal, and statist views of state-society relations, it is tempting to see the (increasingly) repressive regime as the overarching determinant. However, on closer inspection, this cannot be the sole, overarching argument for various reasons. If we look more closely at the periodisation of the emergence of social movements in Russia, we see that the early post-soviet period, which was characterised by the democratisation of society and deep rural poverty, did not generate significant 'open moments' for political group actions, as some expected (Gourevitsch 1986) . Just a few, rather top-down, civil society organisations dealt with rural issues at that time. Among the factors that muted potential for collective political action, we have discussed the continued dependence of rural dwellers on their subsidiary household plots, and the demography of rural society.
Contrary to the calm of the early post-soviet period, the emergence of RSMOs occurred in the last decade, when the political space for contestations became heavily constrained by the Putin government.
We explained the (partially virtual) burst of RSMOs by the growing insecurity that villagers confront regarding their land rights, along with booming land investment and land speculation by Russian elites. This argument is in line with the deprivation thesis. Moreover, the mobilisation of rural dwellers for such a bread-and-butter issue as defending their land (and property) rights is easier in Russia than generating support among the population for more abstract issues such as food sovereignty, food imports, environmental protection, organic farming, or a peasant lifestyle, which have been the basis of mobilization of rural dwellers in other countries (e.g. Evans 2012).
Second, the state's attention to agriculture has increased (although still being at a low level). During the late 1990s and early 2000s, the countryside more or less disappeared from the political agenda, as , available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080 /03066150.2014 .918958#.VeCmsfmqqko. To cite this article: Mamonova, N., & Visser, O. (2014 In answering these questions, it was necessary to distinguish between various types of RSMOs. We have shown that there is a wide diversity of RSMOs (government affiliates, professionalised movements, politically oriented organisations, phantom organisations, and grassroots movements), with a rather limited cooperation between them.
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The grassroots RSMOs are characterised by the highest autonomy from the state and the closest ties with the rural population. The bottom-up emergence of these RSMOs and the bread-and-butter issues they are dealing with allow them to mobilise villagers for open collective protest (against land grabbing, as in the case of Krestyanskiy Front). At the same time, the relative independence from the state restricts political space for their activities, and limits their access to necessary resources (fund raising possibilities, participation in state rural development programmes, informational support).
Therefore, these RSMOs have to search for alternative ways to mobilise resources. The issue of raising money for RSMOs activities is very sensitive in a Russian context in which people tend to distrust any political action and assume hidden self-interests behind every form of collective action.
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The grassroots RSMOs often act within the legal framework. They innovatively use laws, policies, and , available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080 /03066150.2014 .918958#.VeCmsfmqqko. To cite this article: Mamonova, N., & Visser, O. (2014 other officially promoted values to defend the rights of their members and attack disloyal authorities and elites. In this sense, there is some resemblance with the Chinese 'legitimate protest' as conceptualised by O'Brien (1996) . However, the political opportunity structure in Russia is more restricted than in rural China. The understanding of protest in Russia and, more broadly, post-socialist and semi-authoritarian settings, would benefit from future research on how protest in these contexts resembles and deviates from 'legitimate protest'.
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On the other end of the spectrum are the phantom movement organisations (opposite to grassroots RSMOs in terms of activeness) and state-oriented RSMOs such as the politically oriented organisations, professional organisations, and of course, government affiliates (opposite to grassroots RSMOs in terms of independence).
The existence of phantom movement organisations in Russia reflects the state policy of constraining the room for civil and political action. The state control leads to stagnation or shadowing in many local initiatives, and the appearance of pseudo-organisations set up by powerful elites. According to Edelman (1999, 5) , despite the ambiguity and ambivalence of imagined organisations, they can be 'sometimes those with the deepest and most selfless commitments to fundamental change and the greatest capacities for envisioning creative solutions to profound development dilemmas'. So far, there is little evidence that phantom movements are able to generate such creative solutions. In various cases, it seems that they are meant to be only an umbrella for "tertiary" goals.
It might be tempting to see grassroots RSMOs as the only genuine movements, but according to some
Russian scholars (e.g. Vorobjev 2009) the more state-oriented organizations correspond more with the population's ideas on civil society; they should, therefore certainly be classified as part of the civil society, and perhaps even be seen as the genuine movements in Russia. We do not take sides here, but instead argue that there is no one genuine type of movement/organisation. Moreover, it is important not to discard movements with strong state embeddedness too quickly as co-opted. Recent studies on
Russian movements (Abers 2000 , Dagnino 2002 , Henderson 2011 have argued that social movement organisations can be more efficient if they collaborate with the state, while keeping space to protest.
Those RSMOs, which are close to the state, are able to lobby the interests of their members and gain necessary resources for their activities (as in the case of AKKOR). However, we do not observe a significant struggle of the state-embedded organisations to represent the interests of rural dwellers outside the state legalised spaces. Any attempts to oppose the state openly and directly have been , available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080 /03066150.2014 .918958#.VeCmsfmqqko. To cite this article: Mamonova, N., & Visser, O. (2014 suppressed until now (as in the case of Agrarii Rossii). This brings to mind the formation of 'state marionettes'.
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However, more productive than applying such labels as 'state marionettes' is to attempt to analyse why these state embedded RSMOs have not engaged in social and political struggles. 38 With the emergence of the RSMOs being such a new phenomenon, and as this article is the first study on the topic, we can only indicate a few factors that play a role and need further study. The first reason seems to be the power (or rather the lack of it) of the rural population in society. During the past few years, protests in large cities have grown in number (Evans 2010) . The government tries to channel such discontent into arenas it can control to some extent. To give such initiatives legitimacy and attractiveness, the regime has to provide some room for voicing alternative views. With the rural population generally less economically significant, less politically engaged, and more supportive of the regime, the government would feel less of a need to give leeway to such organisations. Second, RSMOs are rather young (except from AKKOR) and, therefore, they might yet to have found the room to voice discontent and strategies of operation.
Whatever the exact reason for the strong state embeddedness and lack of independence of RSMOs, these organisations pay a high price for it. The state affiliates experience a rupture in the already precarious relations with the rural population (most aptly illustrated by the case of AKKOR). The tendency of state affiliates to drift away from their constituency and the existence of phantom movement organisations are likely to reinforce beliefs among the population that social movement organisations cannot be trusted, and that the leaders only follow their own political or economic interests.
Thus, overall, the contemporary RSMOs in Russia face a wide range of challenges, among which their limited political space, fragmentation, often counterfeit or state-dependent character, and most crucially, a weak link with the rural population. Nevertheless, some of them constitute genuine movements, in a rural setting where less than a decade ago they had been absent. 38 It is good to recognise that 'state marionettes' are not just present in semi-authoritarian regimes and/or a sign of weak civil society. In the Netherlands, for instance, the country's communist party was established during the Cold War by the Dutch secret service to enable the monitoring and control of communist forces in society.
